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Singley: The Abolition of Three-Judge Courts: Too High a Price for Judicia

THE ABOLITION OF THREE-JUDGE COURTS:

TOO HIGH A PRICE FOR JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY?
Recent concern with increased judicial burdens, ' occasioned
by growing caseloads 2 which have inundated both the federal district and appellate courts,3 has provoked calls for the selective
elimination of the three-judge court. Under the present federal
statutes,4 a three-judge court must be convened when a plaintiff
1. Between 1968 and 1974 the work of federal judges increased "79.8 percent in terms
of filings, 87.1 percent in terms of terminations and 73.5 percent in terms of pending
cases." REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

COURTS 109 (1974).

In his prepared statement before the House Subcommittee, Judge J. Skelly Wright
expressed particular dismay over the increased judicial burden which three-judge courts
impose: "This burden is an addition to a severe backlog in disposing of cases generally
and represents a subtraction from the time judges can devote to their other business."
Hearings on S. 271 and H.R. 8285 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Seas.,
ser. 27, at 6 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 271]. See also ALI, STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1374, at 317 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]; REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 78 (1970).
2. In fiscal 1974 the increase in new cases docketed in the courts of appeals increased
more than 5 percent over fiscal 1973 and 80 percent over 1968, while terminations increased only slightly. The Division of Information Systems (DIS) reported that "the
backlog of pending cases skyrocketed by almost 101 ." REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE

109 (1974). Growing caseloads in the
Supreme Court have also caused concern:
The statistics of the Court's current workload, both in absolute terms and
in the mounting trend, are impressive evidence that the conditions essential for
the performance of the Court's mission do not exist. . . . [T]he pressures of
the docket are incompatible with the appropriate fulfillment of its historic and
essential functions.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS

STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT

5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FREUND REPORT], in 57 F.R.D. 573, 581 (1972). Docketed
cases increased from 3,559 in the 1967 Term to 4,515 in the 1971 Term. FREUND REPORT at
iv, 57 F.R.D. at 575.
3. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS

INJUDICIAL MACHINERY, pursuant to S. Res. 340, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. at 6 (1971).
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282 (1970). These sections provide as follows:
Injunction against enforcement of State statute; three-judge court
required.
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer
of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made
by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not
be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the uncon-
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stitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
Injunction against enforcement of Federal statute; three-judge court
required.
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution
of the United States shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof
unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of
three judges under section 2284 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970).
28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970) sets forth the composition and procedure of three-judge
courts:
Three-judge district court composition; procedure.
In any action or proceeding required by Act of Congress to be heard and
determined by a district court of three judges the composition and procedure of
the court, except as otherwise provided by law shall be as follows:
(1) The district judge to whom the application for injunction or
other relief is presented shall constitute one member of such court. On
the filing of the application, he shall immediately notify the chief
judge of the circuit, who shall designate two other judges, at least one
of whom shall be a circuit judge. Such judges shall serve as members
of the court to hear and determine the action or proceeding.
(2) If the action involves the enforcement, operation or execution
of State statutes or State administrative orders, at least five days'
notice of the hearing shall be given to the governor and attorney general of the State.
If the action involves the enforcement, operation or execution of
an Act of Congress or an order of any department or agency of the
United States at least five days' notice of the hearing shall be given
to the Attorney General of the United States, to the United States
attorney for the district, and to such other persons as may be defendants.
Such notice shall be given by registered mail or by certified mail
by the clerk and shall be complete on the mailing thereof.
(3) In any such case in which an application for an interlocutory
injunction is made, the district judge to whom the application is made
may, at any time, grant a temporary restraining order to prevent
irreparable damage. The order, unless previously revoked by the district judge, shall remain in force only until the hearing and determination by the full court. It shall contain a specific finding, based upon
evidence submitted to such judge and identified by reference thereto,
that specified irreparable damage will result if the order is not
granted.
(4) In any such case the application shall be given precedence and
assigned for a hearing at the earliest practicable day. Two judges must
concur in granting the application.
(5) Any one of the three judges of the court may perform all
functions, conduct all proceedings except the trial, and enter all orders
required or permitted by the rules of civil procedure. A single judge
shall not appoint a master or order a reference, or hear and determine
any application for an interlocutory injunction or motion to vacate the
same, or dismiss the action, or enter a summary or final judgment.
The action of a single judge shall be reviewable by the full court at
any time before final hearing.
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challenges the constitutionality of a state or federal statute. A
companion statute5 provides for direct appeal to the Supreme
Court. On June 20, 1975, the United States Senate passed a bill6
which would eliminate the requirement for a three-judge court in
most cases. The bill, if passed by the House of Representatives,'
would retain the three-judge court only when explicitly invoked
by an act of Congress8 and in congressional or statewide reapportionment cases The House is likely to approve the proposed
legislation in the near future. Similar measures have been under
A district court of three judges shall, before final hearing, stay any action
pending therein to enjoin, suspend or restrain the enforcement or execution of
a State statute or order thereunder, whenever it appears that a State court of
competent jurisdiction has stayed proceedings under such statute or order pending the determination in such State court of an action to enforce the same. If
the action in the State court is not prosecuted diligently and in good faith, the
district court of three judges may vacate its stay after hearing upon ten days
notice served upon the attorney general of the State.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), which provides as follows:
Direct appeals from decisions of three-judge courts.
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme
Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by
any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges.
6. S. 537, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
7. On June 23, 1975, S. 537 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. 1
CCH CONG. INDEX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975-1976, at 2505.
8. For example, a three-judge court is preserved for certain cases arising under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-5(b), 2000e-6(b) and in cases under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971g, 1973 (a), 1973c, 1973h(c). In two recent enactments, however, the 93d Congress eliminated three-judge courts in areas where they had
previously been expressly required by an Act of Congress. The Antitrust Procedure and
Penalties Act, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974), abolished the three-judge court device which was
available for proceedings subject to the Expediting Act of 1903, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
28; 49 U.S.C. § 44. In another legislative action, taken January 2, 1975, Congress provided
that the Judicial Review Act of 1950 (Hobbs Act) 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351) applies to
proceedings to enjoin or suspend any rule, regulation, or final order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. This reform is contained in 88 Stat. 1917 (1975). Section 7 of the
enactment repeals the provision for the three-judge court in these ICC cases (28 U.S.C. §
2325), and section 5 provides for review by the courts of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2321, as
amended, § 5 Pub. L. No. 93-584 (1975). Direct appeal to the Supreme Court for these
cases (see note 5 supra) is therefore unavailable. For a discussion of these two pieces of
reform legislation see B. Boskey & E. Gressman, Recent Reforms in the FederalJudicial
Structure-Three-JudgeDistrict Courts and Appellate Review, 67 F.R.D. 135 (1975).
9. Three-judge courts are preserved in these cases because the Judiciary Committee
felt they were of great importance and "in any event, they have never constituted a large
number of cases." COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REvISION OF THE JURISDICTION OF THREE-JUDGE
COURTS, S. REP. No. 94-204, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 94-204].
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consideration by both houses since 1971'0 without significant opposition. Moreover, the Supreme Court has construed the existing statutes strictly since its decision in Ex parte Collins" in 1928,
2
thereby paving the way for further narrowing.'
These legislative developments have taken place against a
background of mounting criticism of the existing statutes'3 by
10. See notes 52 & 53 infra.
11. 277 U.S. 565 (1928) (municipal resolution not a "statute" for purposes of invoking
a three-judge court). Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority, agreed with lower court
opinions which held that the statute was to govern "only those [suits] in which the object
• . . is to restrain the enforcement of a statute of general application or the order of a state
board or commission." Id. at 568. The AL! Study states, referring to the Collins opinion:
"The distinction was there drawn, and since repeatedly applied, between cases of statewide significance and those that are of only local interest." ALI STUDY § 1374, supra note
1, at 320 (1969).
12. See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962), where blacks sought to enjoin enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional Mississippi statutes providing for segregation in
transportation services. The Court ruled that three judges were not required when "prior
decisions make frivolous any claim that a state statute on its face is not unconstitutional."
Id. at 33. In construing the three-judge statute strictly, the Court relied on Phillips v.
United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941), where Justice Frankfurter deemed the enactment of
the three-judge court legislation not "a measure of broad social policy to be construed with
great liberality but an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied
as such." Id. at 251. See also Swift v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965) (three-judge court
not required when a state statute is in conflict with, or preempted by a federal statute,
even though the claim ultimately rests on the supremacy clause); California Water Serv.
Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938) (insubstantial constitutional challenge will
not suffice); International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 304
U.S. 243 (1938) (allegation of unconstitutionality of congressional act without application
of injunction insufficient to invoke three-judge court); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30
(1933) (single district judge need not invoke the three-judge panel to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction if claim of unconstitutionality is "insubstantial"); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290
F.2d 632, 635 (9th Cir. 1961) (three-judge court not required where challenged administrative orders with respect to prison regulations "are not of general state-wide application
and do not represent state policy").
13. The procedural aspect of three-judge courts has been recognized as providing "a
constant source of uncertainty and procedural pitfalls for litigants." S. REP. No. 94-204,
supra note 9, at 2. The Freund Report adds its criticism of the device:
When, where, and how to obtain appellate review of an order by or relating to a
three-judge court is a hopelessly complicated and confused subject that in itself
has produced much unnecessary litigation. Judicial and other literature on the
subject is voluminous. There are rules and subrules and exceptions to
rules. . . . [RIeview of these matters has become so mysterious that even
specialists in this area may be led astray.
FREUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 28-29, 57 F.R.D. at 598. Most recently, the Supreme
Court referred to the "opaque terms and prolix syntax" of the three-judge court statutes.
Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1974). See also ALI
STUDY, supra note 1, at 332 (rules for obtaining a three-judge court are "so complex as to
be virtually beyond belief"); FREUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 28, 57 F.R.D. at 598 (obtaining reviews "hopelessly complicated and confused"); H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

967-74 (2d ed. 1973); Currie, The Three-Judge
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advocates who have been touting judicial reform for years.' The
three-judge panel has, for example, been termed "cumbersome"
by several legal commentators 5 and "the single worst feature in
the Federal judicial system" by Professor Charles Alan Wright.'"
This article will not join these critical voices or provide a comprehensive view of the three-judge court and its judicially-imposed
limitations. That has been done too often and too well to be
further expanded. 17 Although it might well be too late to prevent
the demise of the three-judge panel, it is still important to
examine the arguments for and against its elimination and the
possible implications for litigants, particularly in the area of civil
rights.
THE THREE-JUDGE PANEL: HISTORY AND CURRENT APPLICATION

The original Three-Judge Act 8 was a response to the 1875
statute" which had granted lower federal courts jurisdiction over
all cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States.2" In 1903 the first three-judge court was created 21
DistrictCourt in Constitutional Litigation,32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964); Note, ThreeJudge District Courts: Some Problems and a Proposal, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 928 (1969).
14. As early as 1928, one commentator predicted potential difficulties in statutory
interpretation of this jurisdictional enactment:
The judicial interpretation of the long series of statutes dealing with [lower
federal court] jurisdiction has involved not only putting meaning into words as
a matter of grammar and logic, but all decisions on underlying issues, perhaps
not always explained, calling for the statesman's vision in adjusting the relations between state and nation.
Pogue, State Determinationof State Law and the Judicial Code, 41 HARV. L. REv. 623
(1928).
15. Note, 54 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 13, at 934. See also B. Boskey & E. Gressman, supra note 8, at 135.
16. See Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 773 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1876] (statement of Charles Alan Wright). See also
S. REP. No. 94-204, supra note 9, at 2.
17. See Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in ConstitutionalLitigation, 32 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1964). See also Bowen, When are Three Federal Judges Required?, 16
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1931); Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional
Litigation: A ProceduralAnachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 555 (1960); Note, 54 CORNELL
L. REV., supra note 13, at 928; Note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope and Procedure under Section 2281, 77 HARV. L. REV. 299 (1963); Note, The Three-Judge Court
Reassessed: Changing Roles in Federal-StateRelationships,72 YALE L.J. 1646 (1963).
18. Ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823 (1903).
19. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
20. For a discussion of the background of the conflicts and popular resentments which
arose between the passage of the 1875 Act and the Three-Judge Court Act, see Note,
The Three-Judge District Court and Appellate Review, 49 VA. L. REv. 538, 539-42
(1963). For a detailed discussion of the jurisdiction of lower federal courts over cases
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to insure against improvident decisions by a single federal judge
in injunction actions arising under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act"
and the Act to Regulate Commerce.23 If an act of Congress was
to be nullified, Congress reasoned, the decision of more than one
judge should be required. 2 This plan also provided for direct
appeal to the Supreme Court.
In 1910 Congress, elaborating upon this prior legislation, provided for the three-judge device in federal suits to enjoin state
officers from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. 25 More specifically, the need for the three-judge court in suits
of this type was created by the Supreme Court's 1908 decision in
Ex parte Young," which made it possible for a federal judge to
enjoin a state officer from enforcing laws enacted by the legislature of his own state which are repugnant to the United States
Constitution. The Court's decision, that the eleventh amendment
is not a bar to federal suits of this nature, gave rise to a need for
a procedure which would guard "against an improvident state2
wide doom by a federal court of a state's legislative policy."
Vociferous senatorial outcries28 culminated in an act which provided, in part, that three judges must pass upon the constitutionality of a state statute. 29 While lobbying for the legislation
involving the constitutionality of state laws and state actions, see Pogue, supra note 14.
The author notes that the Act of 1875 granting lower federal courts jurisdiction "was a
drastic inroad upon the states' prerogative . . . ." Id. at 625.
21. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823.
22. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
23. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
24. For a discussion of the historical background of the three-judge panel see Pogue,
supra note 14, at 625-26.
25. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (The Mann-Elkins Act). See note
29 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the events leading to the 1910 enactment see Hutcheson, A Case For Three Judges, 47 HARV. L. REV. 795, 798-803 (1934).
26. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
27. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941). See also Cumberland Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1922); 1A J. MOORE,
MooRE's FEDERAl, PRATICE 4 0.205, at 2236 (2d ed. 1974).
28. For the Senate debates which led to the 1910 Act see 42 CONG. REC. 7253-57
(1910). The feelings of some United States citizens about the implications of the Young
opinion were expressed by Senator Overman:
ITihere is great feeling among the people of the States by reason of the fact
that one Federal judge has tied the hands of a sovereign State and enjoined in
this manner the great officer who is charged with the enforcement of the laws
of the State . ...
42 CONG. REC. 4847 (1908).
29. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (The Mann-Elkins Act). The Act's
provisions became § 266 of the Judicial Code of 1911. In 1948 the Judicial Code of 1911
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in 1910, Senator Overman remarked: 3
The point is, the Amendment is for the peace and good
order in the State. Whenever one judge stands up and enjoins
the governor and the attorney-general, the people resent it, and
public sentiment is stirred . . . whereas if three judges declare
that a state statute is unconstitutional the people would rest
easy under it. But let one little judge stand up against the whole
State, and you will find the people of the State rising up in
rebellion. The whole purpose of the proposed statute is for peace
and good order among the people of the States.
Today the three-judge court serves as a forum for litigants
who seek to protect their civil rights by enjoining a state officer
from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional statute. To convene
the three-judge device a plaintiff must challenge a state statute
or administrative order3 ' or a federal statute on the ground that
it is unconstitutional, seek an injunction, and name a state official as a party defendant.32 While the focus of the arguments for
the three-judge court has shifted, 33 many of the same concerns
which Senator Overman expressed still prevail34 and are alleviated when three judges hear a case.
LEGISLATION TO ELIMINATE THE THREE-JUDGE FORUM

The bill passed by the Senate on June 20, 1975,11 would repeal sections 2281 and 2282 of Title 2811 and amend section 2284
of Title 28 . 3 These amendments would not significantly change
was revised and the section became the present 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). The present 28
U.S.C. § 2282 (1970), which provides for three-judge courts in cases involving federal
statutes, was originally the Act of August 24, 1937, 50 Stat. 75 (1937). For further discussion of the 1937 Act see note 43 infra.
30. 45 CONG. REc. 7256 (1910).
31. The 1910 Act was amended in 1913 to include administrative orders made by an
administrative board or commission acting under and pursuant to a state statute. Act of
Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 160, 37 Stat. 1013.
32. See note 4 supra. See also Bowen, supra note 17, at 9.
33. See note 93 infra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 128-29 infra and accompanying text.
35. S. 537, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
A bill similar to S. 537 was introduced in the House on April 17, 1975. This bill would
also repeal 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282, but it differs from the Senate proposal by continuing
the three-judge requirement when a plaintiff's challenge to the constitutionality of a
state or federal statute is based on racial discrimination. H.R. 6150, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
36. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282 (1970). For the text of the statute, see note 4 supra.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970). For the text of the statute see note 4 supra.
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the procedure for convening three judges; however, the device
could be employed only when specifically authorized by an act of
Congress or in actions which alleged the unconstitutionality of
apportionment of congressional districts or of any statewide legislative body."8 The bill has had a multitude of legislative predecessors. The apparent catalyst for the first and all subsequent
bills" was a nine-year study which the American Law Institute
(ALI) undertook in 1960o0 in response to a request by then Chief
Justice Earl Warren. The Chief Justice deemed it "essential that
we achieve a proper jurisdictional balance between the federal
and state court systems, assigning to each system those cases
most appropriate in light of the basic principles of federalism."',
The most significant proposal of the ALI was the repeal of 28
U.S.C. § 2282, which provides for a three-judge court when a
litigant challenges the constitutionality of an act of Congress.2 In
proposing the repeal, the ALI suggested that the original reasons
which influenced Congress in 1937 to require a three-judge court
in challenges to the constitutionality of federal statutes43 were no
longer apposite.44 The proposal recommended, however, the retention of the three-judge court in cases in which the unconstitutionality of a state statute or administrative order" was alleged.
The basic premise underlying the ALI proposal-that what38. In addition, the bill would amend 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1970) to provide for intervention by a state for presentation of admissible evidence and argument in an action in
federal court in which the constitutionality of a state statute is in issue and to which the
state or an agency, officer, or employee of the state is not a party. The present statute
provides for intervention by the United States in actions where the constitutionality of
an act of Congress is in question.
39. See notes 52 & 53 infra and accompanying text.
40. See ALI STUDY, supra note 1.
41. The former Chief Justice was quoted by Senator Burdick before introducing the
Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1973 (S.1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)). 119 CONG.
REe. S. 9637 (daily ed. May 23, 1973).
42. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 325.
43. As part of The Judiciary Act of 1937 Congress extended the three-judge court
requirement to federal statutes as well. 50 Stat. 751 (1937), as amended, 62 Stat. 968
(1948). The enactment was a reaction to the federal judiciary which had been granting
injunctions restraining allegedly unconstitutional New Deal legislation. See 1A J. MOORE,
supra note 27, at 2231; Comment, 27 U. Cm. L. Rav., supra note 17, at 561-63.
44. Many who appeared before both houses of Congress also testified that the 1937
legislation was no longer applicable. See, e.g., Testimony of J. Skelly Wright, Judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Hearingson S. 1876, supra note
16, at 786; Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 7.
45. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 53. The ALI recommended, however, that plaintiffs
who allege the unconstitutionality of a state statute or administrative order be required
to file a request for a three-judge court instead of the device operating automatically. Id.
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ever purposes the statute originally served were no longer applicable-was to prove one of the most compelling arguments in the
effort to eliminate the three-judge court in injunction proceedings

challenging the constitutionality of both state and federal statutes.46 Otherwise, the general reaction to the proposals was that
they were only the prelude to the necessary reform legislation. 7
The ALI's recognition that "the burden on the federal judicial
system that a three-judge court creates is outweighed by the ben-

eficial effect it has on federal-state relations"' 8 was accorded less
weight as concern about judicial burdens grew and federal court
49
caseloads mounted.

In October, 1970, the Judicial Conference of the United
States,5" relying on the report of its Committee on Court Administration that three-judge courts were imposing increased caseloads
on an already overloaded court system, 51 expanded the ALI proposal and submitted draft legislation to the 92d Congress. This
legislation would have eliminated the requirement for three-judge

courts in injunction cases in which the plaintiff alleges the unconstitutionality of state as well as federal statutes.12 Subsequently,
Additionally, section 1374 would have extended the requirement to declaratory judgments
as well. Id. The Committee on the Judiciary promptly dismissed the suggestion that the
statute would ever be invoked in such an instance. S. REP. No. 93-206, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 93-206]; accord, S. REP. No. 94-204, supra note
9,at 5.
46. See notes 59-60 infra and accompanying text.
47. Chief Justice Burger, for example, commended the ALI for its proposals but felt
they did not go far enough: "I firmly endorse the American Law Institute's recommendations but I would go beyond them. We should totally eliminate the three-judge district
courts that now disrupt district and circuit judges' work." Burger, The State of the Federal
Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1053 (1972), in 92 S. Ct. 2921, 2932 (1972).
48. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 320.
49. See note 2 supra and text accompanying note 77 infra.
50. The composition of the Judicial Conference was described by Judge J. Skelly
Wright in his testimony before the House Subcommittee:
The Judicial Conference was created by an act of Congress. It is composed of
the chief judge of each of the circuits . . . and one district judge from each
circuit elected by the judges of the circuit so there are 22 members of the
Judicial Conference, chaired by the Chief Justice of the United States. And the
Judicial Conference functions through committees. There is a Committee on the
Criminal Law, there is a Committee on Judicial Administration, and there is a
Subcommittee on Jurisdiction of the Court Administration Committee . ...
Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 9.
51. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
52. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

78 (1970). The Judicial Conference proposal was embodied in the first bill to eliminate
three-judge courts which was introduced February 8, 1971, by Representative Emanuel
Celler, then Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. H.R. 3805, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
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various bills were introduced which incorporated parts of both the
ALI and Judicial Conference proposals. On May 14, 1971, Senator
Quentin Burdick introduced the Federal Court Jurisdiction Act
of 1971.11 This 1971 Senate bill, as amended, was the forerunner
of legislation proposed in the 93d Congress in 197351 which was
passed by the Senate"5 and sent to the House,5" where it died.-7
The 1973 bill was a direct response to the vigorous and widespread opposition to the three-judge court and is identical to the
proposed legislation. currently before the House.
IMPETUS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE THREE-JUDGE COURT

Since the early 1960's commentators have relied on two
prime arguments to justify their criticism of the three-judge
court: first, the conditions which originally brought about the
need for three-judge courts no longer obtain and, second, judicial
administration is further burdened by three-judge courts. 8
(1971). For a discussion of the bill see Ammerman, Three-Judge Courts: See How They
Run!, 52 F.R.D. 293 (1971).
53. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). This bill was a codificiation of the ALI's
proposals and differed from the Celler legislation, see note 52 supra, in that it retained
the three-judge court for suits in which the plaintiffs alleged the unconstitutionality of a
state statute. Almost a year later, however, the Senator, swayed by "judicial and scholarly
thinking [which] suggested that mere refinement of procedure may not [have been]
sufficient," proposed an amendment to his bill, which would have had the effect of "eliminating three-judge courts in all 'constitutional cases except those involving
reapportionment." 118 CONG. REC. S.6764 (daily ed. April 27, 1972). The 1971 Senate bill
differed from the House bill in essentially two respects: (1) it retained the three-judge
device for reapportionment cases and (2) it did not provide for a state attorney general to
take a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from an injunction against the enforcement of
an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. See Hearingson S. 1876, supra note 16, at 749;
S. REP. No. 94-204, supra note 9, at 10.
54. S. 271, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Senator Burdick reintroduced the bill in 1973
as the Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1973. 119 CONG. REC. S.9637 (daily ed. May 23,
1973). The Judiciary Committee reported on the bill in the Senate on June 12, 1973; 1
CCH CONG. INDEX, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1973-74, at 2504. See S. REP. No. 93-206, supra
note 45.
55. The Senate passed the bill by voice vote. 119 CONG. REC. S.11114 (daily ed. June
14, 1973); 1 CCH CONG. INDEX, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1973-1974, at 2504.
56. The bill was sent to the House Judiciary Committee on June 15, 1973. 1 CCH
CONG. INDEX. 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 1973-1974, at 2504.
57. The House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the bill in October 1973, but
the bill did not go any further. See generally Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1.
58. The Report of the Committee on the Judiciary cites two further reasons for the
legislation: the ambiguity which exists in the application of the three-judge statutes, and
judicial decisions which have provided "safeguards against precipitous injunctive action
by Federal judges." S. REP. No. 94-204, supra note 9, at 3-4, 8.
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Original Reasons for Three-Judge Courts No Longer Apply
The consensus among commentators, judges, and Members
of Congress has been that the original reasons for the three-judge

court are now obsolete. 9 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary,

for example, reported that statutory and regulatory changes have

restrained the power of federal courts from interfering with stateenacted statutes." In its report, the Committee mentioned first
the Federal Equity Rules, enacted in 1912, which prohibit federal
courts from granting ex parte temporary restraining orders for
more than ten days and which added a requirement for notice and

a hearing when a state statute is challenged. 1 Also cited were two
statutes passed in the 1930's which restrict injunctions in certain

cases involving state tax and public utility programs.62 Whether
these statutes are sufficient to eliminate the need for the threejudge court seems far from certain. In any event, they apply only
to specific objects of concern during the period in which they were
enacted. Moreover, changed circumstances have bred new prob-

lems in state and federal relations which require no less attention
than the original situations for which Congress provided the

three-judge court in 1910.63
JudicialBurdens
The second and probably more often-cited motive for elimi-

nating the three-judge court is concern with judicial economy.64
Many opponents of the three-judge panel base their proposals on
statistical evidence which purports to demonstrate the mounting
judicial burden. For example, when the ALI conducted its study
59. In 1972 Judge J. Skelly Wright stated: "The original rationale for the three-judge
court has long been obsolete and, as one commentator pointed out, began to disappear
soon after the original legislation was enacted in 1910." Hearings on S. 1876, supra note
16, at 788. The commentator referred to by Judge Wright is Harris S. Ammerman.
Ammerman, Three-Judge Courts: See How They Run!, 52 F.RD. 293, 297 (1971). See also
S. REP. No. 94-204, supra note 9, at 7; ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 319 (1969); Comment, 27 U. CI. L. REV., supra note 17, at 571; Note, 72 YALE L.J., supra note 17, at 1651.
One commentator has even argued that today the device only seems to represent a congressional distrust of the judiciary. Comment, 27 U. Cm. L. Rv., supra note 17, at 571.
60. S. REP. No. 94-204, supra note 9, at 7-8.
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id. The acts were the Johnson Act of 1934, now 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970), and the
Tax Injunction Act of 1937, now 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
63. See note 93 infra and accompanying text. See also Note, 72 YALE L.J., supra note
17, at 1651. "[Tlhe same changing circumstances which worked to diminish the relevance
of the original Congressional intent provide important new functions which the threejudge court may be able to perform." Id.
64. See notes 1 & 2 supra.
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and wrote its proposal for the elimination of the three-judge
device in certain instances, 5 it relied on annual reports of the
Division of Information Systems66 for 1967.7 In 1970, statistics
of the Committee on Court Administration showed an increase
over previous years in the number of hearings before district
courts composed of three judges. 8 The numerical increase
prompted the Judicial Conference to approve the draft legislation
which was sent to the 92d Congress." The Conference emphasized
the Committee on Court Administration's report that the workloads of the Supreme Court, which heard these cases on direct
appeal, as well as that of the district courts, were affected by this

increase .7o
Between the time of the introduction of the 1971 legislation
and the Senate's most recent bill, other critics have surfaced
armed with statistics and studies. 7' In 1972 the Federal Judicial
Center 7 made available its Report of the Study Group on the
Case Load of the Supreme Court (the Freund Report)73 which
65. See text accompanying notes 40-49 supra.
66. The Division of Information Systems is a department of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts.
67. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 317-18.
68, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COUIRTS 135 (1970). The report showed that there were 291 hearings in 1970, an increase
of 76 cases over 1969 and 112 over the 1968 figure. Of the 291 hearings, 162 were in
connection with civil rights cases.
69. See note 52 supra.
70. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

78 (1970). Upon reviewing the report of the Committee on Court Administration, the
Conference noted:
[T]he direct appeal from such courts to the Supreme Court has often brought
that Court into the review process prematurely and placed the burden of direct
appeal on the Supreme Court in many cases where the winnowing process of
appellate review at the circuit court level would have better served the interests
of justice.
Id.
71. See, e.g., Comment, The Applicability of Three-Judge Courts in Contempora::
Law: A Viable Legal Procedure or a Legal Horsecart in a Jet Age?, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 41'
(1972); Comment, The Three-Judge Court Act of 1910: Purpose, Procedure and
Alternatives, 62 J. CRIM. L. 205 (1971).
72. The Federal Judicial Center was established by Congress in 1967 "to conduct
research and study the operation of the courts of the United States . . . ." 28 U.S.C.
§ 620(b)(1) (1970). The Study Group chairman was Paul A. Freund. Other members included professors of constitutional law and federal procedure and lawyers who had
experience litigating before the Supreme Court. Three of the Study Group members were
former law clerks to Supreme Court Justices. FREUND REPORT, supra note 2, at ix, 57
F.R.D. at 576.
73. See note 2 supra.
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corroborated earlier findings that the Supreme Court was overworked. Essentially, the Study Group recommended the elimination of three-judge courts and direct appeal in cases seeking to
enjoin the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state or
federal statute.74 Pointing out that the ALI's proposal was based
on 1967 figures, the Freund Report dismissed the suggestion that
the three-judge court provided benefits which outweighed the
burden on the federal judiciary 75 and urged that "the balance now
be struck differently."7 The Study Group's findings showed that
the number of cases requiring a three-judge court had increased
by 86 percent between 1967 and 1.971.11 Moreover, concern was
expressed about the "disproportionate amount of the limited
78
time for oral argument" which three-judge courts consumed.
Critics of the three-judge device readily accepted the findings set
forth in the Freund Report, and the movement to eliminate the
device gained strength while support for its retention seemed virtually to cease.79 These critics, however, may have been too anxious to buttress established arguments without addressing themselves to other important considerations.
ARGUMENTS FOR RETAINING THE THREE-JUDGE COURT

80
The submission of ALI and Judicial Conference proposals
to Congress for study and legislative examination8 ' provoked the
expression of other considerations which surfaced in hearings be74. FREUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 27, 57 F.R.D. at 596-97.
75. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
76. FREUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 28, 57 F.R.D. at 598. See also Hearingson S.
1876, supra note 16, at 773, where Charles Alan Wright stated that "more drastic surgery
is required than the Institute has proposed."
77. FREUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 28, 57 F.R.D. at 598.
78. Id. at 29, 57 F.R.D. at 598. The Study Group therefore regarded the percentage
of appeals from three-judge courts of the total docket (2.7 percent) as misleading, for the
cases represented 22 percent of the cases argued orally. Id. See also S. REP. No. 94-204,
supra note 9, at 4-5 (3 percent of total docket "consume a disproportionate amount of the
limited time [22 percent] for argument in the Supreme Court"); Hearings on S. 271,
supra note 1, at 12 (amount of work required by Court on direct appeals is relatively large
even though the percentage is small).
79. The dearth of support for the three-judge forum sparked Charles Alan Wright to
remark: "If there is any informed opinion that today favors retention of the three-judge
court, I am unaware of it." Hearings on S. 1876, supra note 16, at 773.
80. In 1973 the Judicial Conference reaffirmed its support of the bill introduced in
the 93d Congress which embodied the recommendations of the ALI. REPORTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS

48 (1973).

81. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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fore the House Judiciary Committee in 1973 and 1974.2 Even
before that time, the important functions which three-judge
courts perform had not gone unrecognized. At least some commentators,8 3 studies,84 and judicial opinions85 expressed support
for the value of the three-judge device. After the ALI's proposals 8
were announced, however, and the possibility of congressional
action increased, the three-judge court could no longer be praised
solely from an academic or theoretical perspective. The judicial
machinery, which seemed to be in a state of disrepair, was
ready for a proposal to lighten its ever-increasing load. The first
and all subsequent legislation was introduced in the interest of
judicial economy. Arguments that the three-judge court was now
obsolete substantiated these claims. Other concerns were soon
voiced, however, which had to be addressed in any proposal for
reform legislation. Before these other factors are considered the
arguments that the need which originally brought three-judge
courts into existence is no longer present and that the judicial
burdens are insurmountable must be examined.
OriginalReasons for the Three-Judge Court Still Exist
The three-judge court was first created as a "more responsible forum for the litigation of suits which, if successful, would
render void state statutes embodying important state policies.""
Concern with federal intervention in the determination of state
law continues to be important today. 8 As one commentator has
82. See Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 83. Representative Drinan expressed
concern that under the proposal, the 183 civil rights "cases would be rendered impossible."

83. See, e.g., Note, 77 HARv.L. Rav., supra note 17, at 301-03; Note, 49 VA. L. REv.,
supra note 20; Note, 72 YALE L.J., supra note 17.
84. See ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 318-20.
85. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965). In that case the Court
stated that three-judge courts "allow a more authoritative determination and less oppor-

tunity for individual predilection in sensitive and politically emotional areas." Id. at 119.
There has been some recent acknowledgement of the usefulness of the three-judge

court device. In a case which limited the right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court,
Justice Douglas, dissenting, noted that some observers thought the three-judge court more
amenable to suits brought by civil rights and welfare plaintiffs. MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420

U.S. 799, 808 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
86. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
87. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941). See also Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 119 (1965), where the Court stated: "Section 2281 was designed

to provide a more responsible forum for the litigation of suits which, if successful, would
render void state statutes embodying important state policies."
88. The Supreme Court's concern with federalism and comity continues to underlie
its recent decisions involving federal intervention in pending state court proceedings. See,
e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), where the Court held that a federal court could
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observed, the three-judge court "still [serves] one of its original
functions as a valuable palliative to states which must occasionally accept the invalidation of their legislation by federal authority.)"9 If the purpose behind the three-judge court in 1910 and
again in 19371o was to insure careful deliberation concerning allegations of the unconstitutionality of state and federal statutes,
that factor can be of no less significance today. The three-judge
procedure has been characterized as one which "recognizes the
delicate balance inherent in federal-state relations and attempts
to guarantee to the states reasonable freedom in local affairs,
while preserving constitutional rights."'" This suggests that there
is a functional justification as well as historical reasons for relying
on three judges.2 Indeed, the dominant concern today is that a
single judge might wrongly refuse to enjoin the enforcement of an
allegedly unconstitutional statute and not that he or she might
wrongly enjoin a statute that later proved to be constitutional."
Three judges, one of whom is a circuit judge, would feel less
restrained to declare a state statute unconstitutional. 4
Three-Judge Courts Do Not Increase JudicialBurdens
The concerns expressed by the FreundReport, Chief Justice
not enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution absent bad faith or exceptional circumstances; Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 95 S. Ct. 1200 (1975); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971). cf. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
But cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). See generally Field, Abstention in
ConstitutionalCases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
1071 (1974); Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal
Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 841, 860-70 (1972); Note, Federal-QuestionAbstention: Justice Frankfurter'sDoctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARv. L. REV. 604 (1967); The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 42-43, 301-15 (1971). The Senate Committee on
the Judiciary uses these decisions as support for its argument that there are adequate
safeguards against injunctions by federal judges. S. REP. No. 94-204, supra note 9, at 8.
The Commission, however, overlooks the countervailing consideration that the threejudge forum serves a useful purpose for civil rights litigants.
89. Note, .72 YALE L.J., supra note 17, at 1651.90. See note 43 supra.
91. Note, 49 VA. L. REV., supra note 20, at 545.
92. But see authorities cited at note 59 supra.
93. See Letter from John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, to
Hon. Robert F. Drinan, Dec. 18, 1973, as quoted in Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at
151: "A new need and hence a new rationale . . . has replaced the old one: to protect
against imprudent judicial decisions to refrain from taking action." (Emphasis in original.)
94. See notes 120-29 infra and accompanying text. It must be noted, of course, that
federal courts, whether composed of one judge or three, are bound by the abstention
doctrine. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Comm'n of Texas
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See also note 88 supra.
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Burger, and other critics of the three-judge device focus on the
growing burdens on court dockets and judges. Other findings and
views, however, support the theory that these figures do not accurately reflect the facts and that elimination of the three-judge
device will not effect a substantial reduction in the workload of
either the lower federal courts or of the Supreme Court. Justice
Brennan, for example, contends that the Supreme Court is not
95
overworked and that:

[Its] docket has most definitely not swollen to a point where
the burden of screening cases has impaired our ability to discharge our other vital responsibilities . .

.Even if it were as

.

time-consuming and difficult as the Study Group believes, that
would underscore, not diminish its importance ...
It is true, of course, that the number of cases docketed has
increased greatly over the past thirty or forty years . .

.

.But

to concentrate merely on raw statistics, as the Study Group
seems principally to have done, is misleading ....
Other commentators argue that the FreundReport draws its conclusion that the Supreme Court is overworked from "a minimum
of statistical and conceptual analysis . .

.

.,1 In addition, the

House hearings elicited further support for the view that the increased burden which these direct appeals place on the Supreme
Court is exaggerated. Professor Anthony Amsterdam, in his days
as law clerk for a Supreme Court Justice, found that most appeals
were disposed of in as much time as it would take to deny a
petition for certiorari which reached the Court through the dis95. Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 473,
476 (1973). This remark, it should be noted, was made with reference to a National Court
of Appeals which, Justice Brennan believes, should not be allowed to screen cases. For a
discussion of how the Supreme Court decides which cases to review see id. at 477-83. For
a description of what happens when a decision from a three-judge court is referred to the
Supreme Court see Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A.J. 787, 790 (1974).
96. Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253 (1973).
Although Mr. Gressman confines his remarks to a discussion of the National Court of
Appeals, his observations are applicable in this context as well. With respect to the
statistics about the workload of the Court he states:
Raw statistics as to case filings, in short, are but the starting point for
identifying and evaluating the real workload of the Court. How much time is
actually spent by the nine justices and their law clerks in screening these thirtysix hundred cases? How many of the cases are easily and quickly disposed of,
and how many require more prolonged consideration?
Id. at 254. For a comprehensive discussion of the Freund Committee's findings see Symposium, The Freund Report: A StatisticalAnalysis and Critique,27 RuTGERs L. REV. 878
(1974).
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trict courts.9 7 Summary disposition of mandatory appeals is
apparently still the rule. A recent decision limiting direct appeals
to the Supreme Court from three-judge panels noted that between two-thirds and three-fourths of the cases from three-judge

courts are disposed of summarily." There does not appear, then,
to be any conclusive empirical data to support the contention
that Supreme Court Justices are overly occupied with appeals
from three-judge district courts. Indeed, the House hearings
could not produce any time studies which would substantiate the
argument.99
The increasing judicial burden of lower federal courts has

also been attributed, at least in part, to the three-judge court.',9
It is difficult to imagine, however, how the elimination of the

right to a direct appeal would decrease the burden of lower federal
courts. Since suits in which a violation of federal civil rights is

alleged fall within the "federal question" jurisdiction of federal
courts,10' these suits would not necessarily go to a state court but
might instead go to another federal district court. As Professor
Amsterdam has observed, elimination of three-judge courts

will:'02
97. Letter from Anthony G. Amsterdam, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, to
Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 13, 1973, as quoted in
Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 124.
98. See Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 99 n.17 (1974),
citing Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 410 (1960).
The Court included these statistics to bolster its opinion that a review by the court of
appeals in these cases would provide more detailed consideration than they now receive.
99. See Hearingson S. 271, supra note 1.
MR. KASTENMEIER: Do any statistics exist which might be useful for us
to justify. . . in terms ofjudge man-hours or cost in dollars, the saving of which
would justify affirmative action on this bill?
JUDGE WRIGHT: We have made no studies as far as I know, time studies
with reference to three-judge district court cases. All we have with reference to
them is our experience and the bare statistics as to the number and increasing
numbers. . ..
Id. at 11.
100. See notes 1 & 2 supra.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) provides inter alia:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
102. Letter from Anthony G. Amsterdam, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School,
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[R]educe the burden upon the district courts somewhat, and
increase the burden on the courts of appeals somewhat. Both the
reduction and the increase would be a drop in the bucket of the
over-all workload of the lower federal courts.
Furthermore, the ALI based its proposals" 3 on the marked increase in three-judge hearings between 1967 and 1971. Statistics
indicate, however, that their number decreased in 1972, and that
in 1973 there were only two more hearings than in fiscal year 1971.
In 1974, the number of three-judge hearings decreased once again,
resulting in the smallest figure since 1969.0° The statistics for
1975 are not now available so it is difficult to determine whether
the declining trend will continue. Even if statistics show an increase in the number of hearings, however, those cases-because
to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and
Administration of Justice, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 13, 1973, as quoted in
Hearingson S. 271, supra note 1, at 124.
103. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
104.

REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DiREcrOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

COURTS

240 (1974).
THREE-JUDGE COURT HEARINGS BY NATURE OF SUIT
FISCAL YEARS 1963-74

Total

Review
of ICC
orders

Civil
Rights

Reapportionment

All
other

1963...
1964....

129
119

67
50

19
21

16
18

27
30

1965. .
1966, ..
1967....

147
162
171

60
72
64

35
40
55

17
28
10

35
22
42

1968,

Fiscal
year

179

51

55

6

67

1969 ....
1970 ...
1971....
1972....

215
291
318
310

64
42
41
52

81
162
176
166

1
8
2
32

69
79
99
60

1973 ....
1974 ...

320
249

52
51

183
171

7
8

78
19

Percent
change
1974
over
1973....

-22.2

-1.9

-6.6

14.3

-75.6

..

Id. at 241.
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of their inherent complexity and importance-must be afforded
the best possible forum in which to be heard.' 5
Effect of Elimination of Three-Judge Courts on Civil Rights
Litigation
One of the essential aspects of the three-judge forum which
has been underplayed by its critics is the effect its demise will
have on civil rights litigants. The statistics for 1973 show that 320
hearings were held before three-judge courts. Of these, 183 involved civil rights cases.' 6 Proponents of the bill are generally
anxious to point out that the civil rights category includes much
more than racial discrimination cases,' 7 and that of the 349 civil
rights cases heard in 1972 and 1973 only 2 involved allegations of
racial discrimination.' 8 A closer analysis, however, reveals the
importance of the civil rights issues involved in these cases' 0 and
105. See, e.g., Letter from John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights, to Hon. Robert F. Drinan, Dec. 18, 1973, as quoted in Hearings on S. 271, supra
note 1, at 151:
[T]he way to ease this judicial burden is not by leaving the baggage on the train
but by getting more porters. If the need for these additional judges causes a
strain on the judiciary, the Congressional solution should be the appointment
of more judges, not the denial of the extra judicial care and consideration that
three-judge court cases merit. The cases in which three-judge courts are convened are precisely the cases in which this Nation should maximize its use of
judicial manpower.
But see Burger, The State of the FederalJudiciary-1972,58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1050 (1972),
in 92 S. Ct. 2921, 2925 (1972): "Simply adding more judges every few years is not a
solution."
106. See note 104 supra.
107. "It appears that a large number of the 183 cases are only tangentially related to
civil rights." Letter from Judge J. Skelly Wright to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice, House Comm.
on the Judiciary, Oct. 10, 1973, as quoted in Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 15.
108. Letter from Rowland F. Kirks, Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 10,
1973, as quoted in Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 108. The House bill proposes to
provide three-judge courts for the few cases involving racial discrimination. See note 35
supra.
109. The following table further categorizes the type of litigation classified as "civil
rights."
CASES HEARD BY 3-JUDGE COURT WHICH WERE CLASSIFIED AS CIVIL
RIGHTS CASES IN FISCAL YEARS 1972 AND 1973-SHOWING
THE SUBSTANTIVE NATURE OF THE LITIGATION
Fiscal yearType of civil rights case
Total .........................................
Abortion laws .....................................
Assistance to nonpublic schools .....................
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1973

166

183

8
4

3
3
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the reliance civil rights litigants have placed on the three-judge
panel.
The cases heard in 1972 and 1973 include, for example, an
action by women who were denied welfare benefits when they
sought abortions," 0 an action to secure education for retarded
children,"' an action to restrain the seizure of an allegedly obscene film," 2 a class action seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief in connection with the denial to plaintiff-inmates of credit
for time served,"' and a class action seeking a declaratory judgment that a House bill conditioning the receipt of welfare benefits
on a one-year residency requirement was unconstitutional."' Because of the importance and complexity of these suits and the
delicate balance between state and federal governments which
they affect, the decision to deny a three-judge hearing must rest
on more than judicial economy. "'
During the House hearings, an apparent insensitivity to
federalism and the problems of civil rights litigants on the part
of the critics of three-judge courts was typified by the following
Education for the handicapped ......................
Employm ent ......................................
Expelling students .................................
Housing ..........................................
Obscenity .........................................
Prejudgment attachments, seizure of property without notice
Penal codes and prisoner positions ...................
Residency requirements ............................
Sobriety tests .. ...................................
T axes ..................................... .......
Voting and election laws ..........
.............
Welfare, social security, and unemployment benefits
Constitutionality of a State statute (not classified above)
Other (not cited in sufficient frequency to classify above)

2

3
7
4
12
21
5
35
23
9
28

1
8
3
3
12
10
11
25
2
3
30
23
12
29

Hearingson S. 271, supra note 1, at 109.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 110.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 111. For the substantive nature of other cases classed as civil rights see
id. at 109-22.
115. Nathaniel R. Jones, General Counsel of the NAACP, interpreted the increase in
suits requiring a three-judge court as follows:
What these figures say to me . . . is that the [three-]judge court is a highly
desirable mechanism for dealing with serious constitutional problems facing
citizens. Why should a mechanism that is so highly utilized be crippled, or
worse, eliminated?
Statement of Nathaniel R. Jones before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 143.
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interchange between Assistant Attorney General Robert G.
Dixon, Jr., and Congressman Robert Drinan:"6
MR. DRINAN: Well, sir, I am just asking you for a reason
now; and the enforcement of civil rights, I do not have to remind
you, is a very difficult thing; and why should we say to 183
plaintiffs all over this country that we are wiping away the remedy that you have elected as the best possible way for you to
assert your rights?
MR. DIXON: We have to balance objectives here. Historically
there was felt to be a problem of prejudice on the part of a single
judge who was sought by plaintiffs to enjoin operations of State
regulatory statutes in the early days, and the three-judge court
was thought to be beneficial to broaden the viewpoint and avoid
casual invalidation of State law. We have gotten away from
feelings that we used to have that a single judge would be either
prejudiced or more parochial in his viewpoint than three judges.
The problem has receded.
MR. DRINAN: Well who says that, sir? . . . [W]ho is the we

who gets away from these feelings? I do not see that in the
figures reflected here. I do not see that in the civil rights movement and I do not see my lawyers here saying that we [would]
just as soon have one [judge]. You are saying this for the Department of Justice and you do not even have.

. . any

statistics

to [justify] a belief that we have gotten away from the Federal
judges [sic] biases and give us some evidence of that.
The historical argument upon which Mr. Dixon relied palls when
other considerations are introduced. The cases which civil rights
litigants bring before the three-judge forum reflect modem sensitivities and new areas of potential conflict between state and
federal governments." 7 The equal protection clause, especially as
it has been used in suits for injunctive relief brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,118 is no less of a threat to federal-state relations
116. Id. at 83, 84-85.
117. The ALI expresses these concerns in its study:
But if the particular problems that strained relations between the states
and the federal courts a half century ago are no longer present, other controversies have arisen that are not less sensitive. Federal courts still force social and
political changes on the states by injunctions against state practices that violate
the Constitution of the United States.
ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 319. See also Note, 72 YALE L.J., supra note 17, at 1651.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Civil action for deprivation of rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
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than the due process clause was in former years."'
Another important factor which must be evaluated to decide
whether to eliminate the three-judge court is the influence of local
bias on a single judge. Suits which allege the violation of a civil
right often arise in a community which has little sympathy with
the litigant's claim.'20 This was certainly the situation in racial
discrimination cases which arose in the aftermath of Brown v.
Board of Education.'2' This observation appears to hold true in
other civil rights cases as well. In a letter written to Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, Professor Amsterdam hastened to demythologize
the
12
belief in the impartial federal district court judge: 1
Under the circumstances, it would be unnatural-it would
be superhuman-if the force of local sentiment were not reflected to some extent in the attitudes and reactions of the local
federal district judges to the cases that come before them. To
say, as I am quick to say, that some federal district judges have
long and consistently managed to hold the balance true notwithstanding these local pressures, is an enormous tribute to them.
It is not, however, an accurate description of how most federal
district judges can humanly be expected to behave most of the
time. However much integrity, strength and good-will they may
tom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
119. The ALI Study points out that the "exercise of federal supremacy [is] no less
delicate" where the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due Process Clause is at
issue. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 319-20.
120. We must realistically appreciate, I think that most civil-rights controversies that require resort to injunctive lawsuits seeking an invalidation of state
statutes or administrative regulations. . . arise against a background of significant local hostility to the claims asserted by the civil-rights plaintiffs. The
defendants are almost invariably state or local agencies or officials who, with
strong support of local popular sentiment, have rejected the plaintiffs' claims
or persisted over their objections in treating them in a way that the plaintiffs
assert is federally unconstitutional. Under these circumstances, it is not accidental-it is inevitable in the very nature of these cases-that the plaintiffs find
themselves confronted by a solid phalanx of opposition on the part of the local
social and political power structure.
Letter from Anthony G. Amsterdam, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, to Robert
W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of
Justice, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 13, 1973, as quoted in Hearings on S. 271,
supra note 1, at 123.
121. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
122. Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 123 (emphasis in original).
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have, they are-like all of us-affected by their environment in
a host of unconscious or half-conscious ways.

Professor Amsterdam's forthright letter was not the only occasion
on which this concern was expressed. Justice Douglas echoed
these thoughts when he dissented in MTM, Inc. v. Baxley,"'
' In attemptwhich limited direct appeals to the Supreme Court. 24
ing to present an impartial view of the three-judge court, 25' Justice Douglas argued that "[t]hree judges may well display more
sensitivity to national policies and perspectives than would a
,,.IJohn A. Buggs, Staff Director, United
single judge .
States Commission on Civil Rights, in a letter to Representative
Drinan, stated:'27
A single judge confronted by such a controversial statute is
less likely than two or three judges to find the facts and make
the judgments which would subject him to hostile public opinion.

Another reason for retaining the three-judge court emerged
123. 420 U.S. 799, 807 (1975).
124. The majority in MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799 (1975), held that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over a direct appeal from a three-judge court under 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) where the order of the three-judge court denying injunctive relief was
based not on the merits of the constitutional claim but on the impropriety of federal
intervention in state proceedings. The Court based its decision in large part on its recent
decision in Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974), where it
had held that the right of direct appeal did not lie from a three-judge court dismissal for
lack of standing. Id. at 101. The Gonzalez Court also considered the question of what
constitutes an order "denying" injunctive relief for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Id.
at 94-96. But cf. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962).
125. Justice Douglas refrained from expressing his opinion with respect to whether
the three-judge court should be eliminated, attributing to Congress, not the courts, the
responsibility for that decision. MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 808-09 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 808, referringto Hearingson S. 271, supra note 1, at 150 and Note, 72 YALE
L.J., supra note 17, at 1652-53.
127. Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 150. See also Testimony of Nathaniel R.
Jones, General Counsel, NAACP, id. at 142-43, where further concern with political and
local biases was expressed:
We would be closing our eyes to reality. . . were we not to acknowledge awareness of the process by which many lawyers are selected for the federal bench. It
would be expecting super-human powers on the part of the jurists to expect that
an'immediate transformation occurs and they suddenly become insensitive to
the feelings, inclinations and predilections of those who participated in their
elevation to the bench. . ..
. . T ]hree-judge courts are more resistant to local influence and the members who constitute the court can thereby deal with the issues with greater
concern for the merits and the law.
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from the hearings: considerably greater weight is given to a decision to invalidate state or federal legislation when it is reached
by three judges. Since the local district judge has made a reasoned decision with two other judges, one of whom is a circuit
judge, that judge need not bear the brunt of local hostilities
alone. "' 8 Of additional import, especially in constitutional areas,
is that the opinion itself will be accorded more respect by other
courts, by the community in which the controversy arises, and by
the litigants themselves:'29
[Blecause of its inherent prestige, the input of two additional
minds and the presence of at least one circuit court judge, the
decision of a three-judge court carries greater legal and moral
authority than the decision of a single judge. Accordingly, it is
more likely that three-judge court orders in controversial cases
will be voluntarily complied with and on the whole better accepted by whichever side loses.
The effect which the elimination of the three-judge forum would
have on civil rights litigants is too severe to be dismissed by
unsubstantiated and misplaced concerns about judicial overburdening and erroneous statements that the policy behind the use
of these courts no longer exists.
PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE THREEJUDGE COURT

In addition to arguments based on judicial economy and policy, there are important procedural implications of abolishing
the three-judge forum. Testimony before the House Subcommittee indicated that a more stable forum of three is important in
the procedural and evidentiary, as well as the substantive aspects
of cases.'30 While a hearing before a single judge need not be the
ultimate determination in that an appeal can be taken to a multi128. See Letter from Anthony G. Amsterdam Professor of Law, Stanford Law School,
to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 13, 1973, as quoted in Hearings
on S. 271, supra note 1, at 123.
129. Letter from John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, to Hon.
Robert F. Drinan, Dec. 18, 1973, as quoted in Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 150.
See generally MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 808 (1975) (three judges "inspire more
respect," Douglas, J., dissenting); ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 320 (moral authority of
court order maximized if decreed by three judges, citing Note, 77 HARV. L. REV., supra
note 17, at 302); Note, 72 YALE L.J., supra note 17, at 1653 (three judges reassure public
that courts' deliberations are broad, thorough, and impartial).
130. Letter from John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, to Hon.
Robert F. Drinan, Dec. 18, 1973, as quoted in Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 150.
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judge appeals court, this may be an inadequate procedure by
which to insure the protection of inviolable constitutional rights.
First, the opportunity to appear before several judges might
depend on whether the litigant can afford to take an appeal to a
higher court, 3 1 with the possibility of additional expense if appeal
to the Supreme Court is warranted. Furthermore, because of the
limited review powers of an appeals court, appellate judges are
bound in most instances by the trial judge's findings of fact.
When a determination of the constitutionality of a statute rests
on facts concerning the statute's "application," "operation," and
"effects," it is particularly important to have the benefit of three
judges: the findings of fact may well determine if the statute is
unconstitutional, and the findings will be reversed only in the
event that they are clearly erroneous. 32 A trial judge's ruling on
a procedural matter, while it can be corrected on appeal, could
be "extremely damaging to the posture of a civil rights case and
to the political movement which generated it."'' 1 3 In addition, any
discretionary decision which the trial judge makes which could
effectively determine the outcome of the litigation may not be
able to be corrected on appeal.'34 In a discussion of appellate
review in his letter to the House Subcommittee, Professor Amsterdam noted that the date set for an injunction proceeding is
3
determined by the trial judge and is not reviewable on appeal. 1
The forms of interlocutory and final equitable relief and the conduct of settlement conferences are also mentioned by Professor
Amsterdam as items which are outside the province of the appellate court.' 3' Moreover, he cited additional examples of the proce37
dural implications of the elimination of the three-judge court:
131. See Note, 72 YALE L.J., supra note 17, at 1654.
132. See Letter from Anthony G. Amsterdam Professor of Law, Stanford Law School,
to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 13, 1973, as quoted in Hearings
on S. 271, supra note 1, at 123. Professor Amsterdam argues that especially when the facts
are "constitutional" rather than "adjudicative" it is essential to have a three-judge determination, for the trial court in these instances "has enormous discretion as to whether to
permit them to be proved at all." Id. The professor further opines that this "discretion
may affect the rule of law that eventually emerges from the case." Id.
133. Letter from John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, to Hon.
Robert F. Drinan, Dec. 18, 1973, as quoted in Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 150.
134. Id. Rulings on evidence and the court's timing of what it will hear and do are
examples of such discretionary determinations.
135. Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 123.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 123-24.
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In other cases, the shape of the court's remedial decree-a
subject almost wholly within trial-court discretion-determines
whether plaintiffs win a paper victory or a real one. In still other
cases, low-visibility~procedural decisions, such as whether the
defendant's motion for summary judgment is consolidated for
hearing with the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction,
or whether the preliminary injunction hearing is deferred until
the completion of discovery depositions, may determine the outcome of the case.
It is difficult to applaud the demise of the three-judge court
in light of the serious procedural consequences which would follow. Unless their claims meet the requirements of the appropriate
sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 38 future civil rights litigants will no longer be able to appear before a circuit judge and
two district judges. This will be the case even if they allege a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which gives a remedy to those
deprived of their civil rights but does not require a three-judge
court.
An additional implication of the demise of the three-judge
court in cases alleging the unconstitutionality of state or federal
statutes is the possible elimination of the requirement of a threejudge forum in reapportionment cases and cases brought under
the pertinent sections of the Civil Rights Act 3 ' and the Voting
Rights Act.4 0 When asked at the House hearings whether the
three-judge device might be made unavailable in these cases,
Judge J. Skelly Wright did not rule out the possibility but stated
that such a proposal would have to be deliberated by the Judicial
Conference.' Furthermore, the Conference did not find the issue
bothersome "' since there are few cases which arise under these
statutes. The possibility is not remote,' however, and all the
arguments against the elimination of three-judge courts in constitutional cases apply with equal force to cases arising under these
138. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971g, 2000a-5(b), 2000e-6(b) (1970).
139. Id.
140. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), 1973c, 1973h(c) (1970).
141. Hearingson S. 271, supra note 1, at 10.
142. Id.
143. Mr. Dixon, in his statement before the Subcommittee, conceded: "Further study
might show that three-judge courts could be eliminated in all of these [I.C.C., antitrust,
and certain civil rights] cases as well." Hearings on S. 271, supra note 1, at 91. Subsequent to the hearings, antitrust cases brought under the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 28
(1970), 49 U.S.C. § 44 (1970), and I.C.C. cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1970) were deemed
no longer to require a three-judge forum. See note 8 supra.
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statutes. This
involved. The
should not be
constitutional

is true despite the fact that only a few cases are
opportunity to appear before a three-judge court
denied to litigants who bring suit in these crucial
areas.
CONCLUSION

In 1964 Professor Currie suggested that the three-judge provisions "are products of battles between competing political forces
over four persistent and significant issues: judicial review, national supremacy, sovereign immunity, and the use of the injunction."'' The ALI Study pays heed to Professor Currie's words,
adding: "With political issues of such moment as these involved,
procedural efficiency cannot be the only determinant of when to
require three judges."' 45 In light of available statistics, it is not
likely that legislation to eliminate three judges will achieve the
desired result of a lesser-burdened, more efficient federal judiciary. Moreover, this result, to the extent it is realized at all, will
be reached at a high price: the frustration of the still valid policy
reasons which, though lately redirected, originally gave rise to the
implementation of three-judge courts. Whatever the presumed
benefits in administrative efficiency may be, they cannot outweigh the injury which will accrue to civil rights litigants seeking
to assert their federally-guaranteed rights and the resulting harm
to the federal system that guarantees those rights.
Wendy G. Singley
144. Currie, 32 U. CHI. L. REv., supra note 17, at 3.
145. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 318-19.
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